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. Introduction
In evaluating potential targets for mergers and acquisitions
M&A), acquiring ﬁrms must take several factors into account: the
alue of the target company’s tangible and intangible assets, the
otential for synergies between the merging ﬁrms, cost-of-capital
nd tax considerations, and more. A factor that has become increas-
ngly important in recent years is intellectual property. A large
atent portfolio can positively inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s valuation in M&A
or a number of reasons. Patents are legal titles that grant their
wners a temporary monopoly power over the use of an invention.
hus, they can be used to enforce exclusivity, to extract licens-
ng income, or as a bargaining chip in negotiations. We  refer to
hese uses of intellectual property as the monopoly or legal value of
atents. Patents can also be correlated with ﬁrm value because they
rovide information about the quality of inventions and overall
corporate technological strength” (Long, 2002; Narin et al., 1987).
atenting is expensive, thus only inventions that are deemed suf-
ciently valuable are patented. Moreover, examiners must check
∗ Corresponding author at: University of Aberdeen Business School, Edward
right Building, Dunbar Street, Aberdeen AB24 3QY, UK. Tel.: +44 01224 273423.
E-mail addresses: sharon.belenzon@duke.edu (S. Belenzon),
.patacconi@abdn.ac.uk (A. Patacconi).
1 Address: Duke University: The Fuqua School of Business, 100 Fuqua Drive,
urham, NC 27708, USA. Tel.: +1 919 660 7845.
048-7333/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.05.001that inventions satisfy minimum standards of novelty and non-
obviousness. More broadly, large patent portfolios may  suggest
that ﬁrms are well-managed and possess valuable R&D capabilities.
Thus, large patent portfolios can signal technological strength.
However, recent patent and administrative reforms have most
likely affected both the monopoly and the informational (or
“quality-signaling”) value of patents. There is a broad consen-
sus among academics and practitioners that patent protection in
most OECD countries has been considerably strengthened since the
1980s (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Lerner, 2002). Important steps in this
direction have been the creation in 1982 of a “pro-patent” Court of
Appeals in the U.S., the subsequent upward harmonization of intel-
lectual property protection standards via international agreements,
and the extension of patentability to new subject matter such as
biotechnology and software (in the U.S., also business methods).2
Thus, the monopoly value of patents has most likely increased in
the last three decades.
At the same time, patent examination standards appear to
have declined. Jaffe and Lerner (2004) provide several examples
of obvious or non-novel ideas that were granted patent protection,
including a “Method to Swing on a Swing”, the “Sealed Crustless
Sandwich”, Rambus’s divisional applications on developments of
2 Recent judicial decisions, however, have arguably restricted the range of busi-
ness methods that are patentable in the U.S.
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accept rather than reject applications than examiners in Europe or
Japan. One reason is that, by transforming the USPTO in a user-
fee funded entity, the 1990 Omnibus Act may  have promoted
5 According to Mejer and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2011), turnover of
employees at the USPTO is about 33%, compared to just 3% at the EPO.
6 Quillen and Webster (2001) estimate that the patent approval rate for the USPTOS. Belenzon, A. Patacconi / Res
ts DRAM technology, and, perhaps more controversially, one-click
usiness models. Importantly, the decline in examination stan-
ards appears to have been pronounced especially in the U.S., due
o a number of institutional, legal and cultural factors (Guellec and
an Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). Thus,
atent “quality” (broadly intended to encompass both the tech-
ological and value dimensions of patented inventions) may  have
eclined more in the U.S. than in other major jurisdictions.
Motivated by these considerations, the present paper examines
ow the relationship between ﬁrm value and patent-based indi-
ators of inventive activity has changed in the last three decades.
e use data from more than 33,000 mergers and acquisitions
eals between 1985 and 2007, and distinguish between American
USPTO) and European (EPO) patents. We  ﬁnd that while the effect
f EPO patents on acquisition value has remained essentially stable
ver this time period, the effect of USPTO patents has declined sub-
tantially and is essentially zero near the end of the sample period.3
iven that patent protection rights were strengthened during this
ime period, our results suggest that an increasing number of USPTO
atents were granted for inventions that had little or no economic
r technological value. USPTO patents seem to be losing their role
s signals of ﬁrms’ inventive efforts and value.
The robustness of our ﬁndings is probed in several ways. Qual-
tatively similar results are obtained when patents are weighed
y citations, although citation-weighing generally increases the
mportance of USPTO patents. This is expected since citations
roxy for patent quality and patent quality may  to some extent
e observed by the acquiring ﬁrm (Hall et al., 2005). Our ﬁnd-
ngs are driven by patents owned by small ﬁrms. This is also not
urprising given that intellectual property and signaling consid-
rations are arguably most important in the start-up phase of a
rm’s life. There is also substantial heterogeneity across industries.
he decline in the importance of USPTO patents is most evident in
rugs and chemicals, while no such decline is found in computers
nd electronics.4 We  ﬁnd similar results in biotechnology and more
raditional segments of the drug and chemical industries. This does
ot support the presumption that U.S. patent quality declined most
harply in new technology ﬁelds (Hall, 2007; Merrill et al., 2004).
inally, EPO patents appear to have become more important over
ime, relative to USPTO patents, when acquiring and target ﬁrms
elong to different industries or operate in different countries. We
onjecture that, in these deals, because acquiring ﬁrms may  ﬁnd it
ore difﬁcult to evaluate a target ﬁrm’s technology, EPO patents
ay  be perceived as “safer.” The EPO system may  be providing some
uality certiﬁcation – a certiﬁcation which becomes more impor-
ant as uncertainty and informational asymmetries grow (Akerlof,
970).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next
ection discusses some features of the American and European
atent systems that motivate our empirical analysis. Sections 3 and
 describe the data and econometric speciﬁcation. Section 5 reports
he results. Section 6 concludes.
. Background and predictions
.1. The changing institutional environmentThere is widespread consensus among academics and practi-
ioners that, starting from the early 1980s, various patent and
3 However, we also ﬁnd a large increase in USPTO patent valuations in the late
990s. This increase was most likely a consequence of the exuberance that charac-
erized of the dot-com years.
4 In software, a technology area where patenting has often been regarded as dubi-
us,  neither USPTO nor EPO patents matter for value in any of the sample periods. Policy 42 (2013) 1496– 1510 1497
administrative reforms have led to a strengthening of the legal
value of patents. In the U.S., a key step in this direction was the cre-
ation in 1982 of a specialized Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit
(CAFC). Although the stated objective of Congress was to provide
uniformity in patent litigation cases, the court soon demonstrated
a “pro-patent” disposition (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998; Merges,
1992). Speciﬁcally, the court was  found to uphold in appeal a larger
proportion of decisions favorable to the patent holder, to reverse
a larger proportion of decisions unfavorable to patent holder, and
to substantially increase the rate of preliminary injunctions, com-
pared to the previous system (Gallini, 2002; Lanjouw and Lerner,
2001). The deﬁnition of patentable subject matter was also broad-
ened to include emerging new ﬁelds such as biotechnology and
software, and patent duration was lengthened. Several countries
followed the U.S. example, which led over time to an upward har-
monization of intellectual property protection standards (Guellec
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007; Lerner, 2002).
The strengthening of the legal value of patents gave ﬁrms
powerful incentives to seek patent protection (Hall and Ziedonis,
2001; Kortum and Lerner, 1999). Patent applications nearly tripled
between 1980 and 2000 in the U.S., with Europe and Japan fol-
lowing suit. But as patents became more powerful legal weapons,
concerns about the ease with which they were granted began to
grow. Observers noted that way  too often patents were granted
for ideas that were neither novel nor non-obvious. Some – most
notably Jaffe and Lerner (2004) – went as far as to argue that
lower standards could endanger innovation and progress because,
if applicants could get patents for obvious or existing ideas, then
patents could used to harass, seek compensation from, or even shut
down legitimate businesses. Overwhelmingly, however, criticism
about declining patentability standards has been directed toward
the American system. Several arguments underpin the belief that
examination standards are lower (and, until quite recently at least,
have been getting worse) in the U.S. than in Europe or Japan.
First, the USPTO is severely understaffed relative to other major
patent ofﬁces. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007)
estimate that “both the incoming workload of examiners (number
of claims ﬁled per examiner) and their output (number of claims
granted per examiner) is three to four times higher at the USPTO
than at the EPO” (p. 201). Thus USPTO examiners spend consid-
erably less time than EPO examiners on each claim. Retention of
experienced personnel has also proved to be particularly difﬁcult
at the USPTO, due to a combination of relatively low salaries and
attractive outside options.5 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Pot-
terie conclude that decisions at the EPO tend to be based on a more
careful and expert assessment of the prior art than at the USPTO,
which might explain the much higher rejection rates in Europe.6
Second, USPTO examiners appear to face stronger pressures towhen corrected for continuing applications is in the range of 95–97%, substantially
higher than for the EPO or JPO. Jaffe and Lerner (2004) also show that successful
USPTO applications have risen in the period between 1987 and 1998 twice as much
as  ‘important’ inventions that were granted in all three of the world’s major patent
jurisdictions (the USPTO, EPO, and JPO). They argue that this ﬁnding is “hard to
explain in any manner other than declining standards in the U.S. PTO, producing
an  ever-growing proportion of U.S. patents the patent-holders themselves did not
think merited patenting elsewhere” (p. 143). Finally, Gallini (2002) notes that if the
time series of Kortum and Lerner (1999) is extended to include the second half of the
1990s, Kortum and Lerner’s conclusion that the U.S. did not become an increasingly
attractive destination for foreign inventors is tempered, thus “lending some support
for the ‘friendly court’ hypothesis” (p. 138).
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 “customer-friendly” mentality. Jaffe and Lerner (2004) provide
everal examples illustrating the dysfunctional effect of such
 mentality. Most importantly, USPTO examiners are rewarded
ccording to how fast they process applications. However, since
pplicants can modify and appeal initially rejected patents, rejec-
ions tend to be very time-consuming. Thus, USPTO examiners have
trong ﬁnancial incentives to accept rather than reject applications.
Third, from its inception the EPO allows third parties to chal-
enge claims in a patent for nine months after the patent is granted.
his permits additional prior art references to be submitted and
llows further veriﬁcation of the patentability conditions (Mejer
nd van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2011). In the U.S., by con-
rast, a similar post-grant review process has only recently been
ntroduced with the 2011 America Invents Act.
Fourth, until quite recently, court decisions have tended to
eaken U.S. patentability standards. The CAFC established, for
nstance, that prior publication obviates novelty only when all
he features of an invention have been revealed by a single prior
ublication,7 and established “the reasonable expectation of suc-
ess” as a lower standard of non-obviousness8 (Barton, 2000; Lesser
nd Lybbert, 2004). There are also fewer limitations on patentable
ubject matters in the U.S. than in Europe. Inventions in the areas of
oftware, business methods and genetics, for instance, are gener-
lly patentable in the U.S. but not in Europe. The explosion of patent
ctivity in new technology areas has been viewed with particular
oncern by critics of the USPTO. Examination standards appear to
ave been too low in these ﬁelds (at least initially), due to inexpe-
ience on the part of examiners, lack of adequate written prior art
ocuments, and court decisions (Merrill et al., 2004; Hall, 2007).
Last but not least, patenting costs are much lower in the U.S. than
n Europe or Japan. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Franc¸ ois
2009) estimate that an EPO patent that is renewed for 20 (10)
ears in 13 member states costs almost 9 (4.6) times as much as a
SPTO patent. An obvious effect of low patenting costs is to encour-
ge low-value applications and increase the variance of the patent
uality distribution by stretching its bottom tail. Perverse feedback
ffects can also arise, with low patenting costs exacerbating work-
oad problems.9 Moreover, ﬁrms may, when they have a choice,
tart ﬁling strategically, by ﬁrst applying for USPTO patents and
nly subsequently, if the inventions turn out to be valuable, for the
ore expensive EPO patents. Combined, these effects could lead
ver time to a wider quality gap between EPO and USPTO patents.10
.2. Patent portfolio evaluation in M&A: the effect of institutional
hange
From a ﬁnancial perspective, the ﬁrm can be viewed as a portfo-
io of investment projects; thus the value of the business as a whole
an be computed as the net present value of the cash ﬂows it gener-
tes. As mentioned in the Introduction, patents (and by extension
atent portfolios) can be positively correlated with ﬁrm valuations
7 Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus. Inc., 726 F.2d 724 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
8 Amgen, Inc.  v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,  927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
9 How changes in the patent fee structure can improve the patent quantity-quality
radeoff is an important topic in policy debates, especially after the USPTO raised its
ees in 2004. See Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie for a discussion (2007,
p.  212–213).
10 In general, ﬁrms have the possibility to seek patent protection in multiple
ountries, but will only use this possibility for inventions that they deem sufﬁ-
iently valuable to justify the extra expense. USPTO and EPO patents are in this
espect arguably different because, while a USPTO patent may  or may not be part of
 patent family comprising a number of equivalent patents in different countries, an
PO  patent is almost always the result of a decision that the invention is worth the
xpense of seeking protection in multiple countries, as a single national application
ould otherwise be less expensive (we thank an anonymous referee for pointing
his out to us). Policy 42 (2013) 1496– 1510
because (i) they establish exclusionary rights on patented inven-
tions and (ii) provide useful signals about the quality of patented
inventions and overall corporate technological strength.
Several studies conﬁrm the usefulness of patent statistics as
indicators of ﬁrms’ inventive efforts and value (e.g., Griliches, 1990).
Deng et al. (1999) ﬁnd that the number of patents granted to a
ﬁrm in a given year and patent citation measures (forward cita-
tions and “science link”) are strongly associated with subsequent
market-to-book ratios. Positive associations between ﬁrm value
and citation-weighed patent indexes are also found by Bloom
and Van Reenen (2002), Hall et al. (2005) and Belenzon (2012),
among many others. Pakes (1985) demonstrates that an unex-
pected increase in the number of patents granted to a ﬁrm is
associated with a large change in market value. Using a comprehen-
sive survey instrument, Gambardella et al. (2008) directly ask for
information about the perceived value of patents, rather than try-
ing to infer patent values using estimation techniques. They report
very high estimates, with the average patent value above EUR10
million, and a median of EUR650 thousand. Lastly, in a sample of
pharmaceutical ﬁrms, Narin et al. (1987) ﬁnd that patent counts are
highly correlated with several measures of corporate technological
strength such as the number of new drugs registered, important
new drugs approved, scientiﬁc articles published, and expert opin-
ions of corporate technical strength.
In this paper, we  focus on the contribution of patent portfolios
to the valuation of target ﬁrms in M&A  deals. In evaluating patent
portfolios, acquiring ﬁrms must take several factors into account.
Factors frequently mentioned by practitioners include: (i) changing
market conditions and technology cycles, (ii) the level of novelty of
the patented inventions, (iii) the strength and breadth of exclu-
sionary rights, (iv) the difﬁculty of inventing around, (v) the risks
of patent disclosure, (vi) a ﬁrm’s overall portfolio position (includ-
ing the potential for further patents), and (vii) bargaining potential
(Wilson, 2007). Moreover, in M&A  the value of potential syner-
gies between acquiring and target ﬁrms can be partly incorporated
into the target ﬁrm’s price (Slusky and Caves, 1991). Thus, patent
portfolio valuations in M&A  may  also reﬂect ﬁrm-speciﬁc and deal-
speciﬁc factors, not just the value of the patent portfolio in some
absolute sense.
The previous discussion suggests that patent reforms have
affected both the level of novelty of the patented inventions and
the strength and breadth of exclusionary rights (points (ii) and
(iii) in the classiﬁcation above). We  put forward two  potentially
conﬂicting hypotheses. The ﬁrst one states that, because patents
have become more potent legal weapons, the effect of both USPTO
and EPO patents on corporate valuations has grown stronger in
recent times.
H1 (Strengthening of patent protection rights). The relationship
between ﬁrm value and USPTO and EPO patents has grown stronger
in recent times.
The second hypothesis states that, because patent quality
appears to have declined more in the U.S. than in Europe, EPO
patents may  have become over time a more reliable indicator of
technological strength than USPTO patents. Thus, the effect of EPO
patents on acquisition value in M&A  should have become stronger
over time, relative to the effect of USPTO patents. Note that it is pos-
sible that the quality of USPTO patents may  have declined so much
as to completely outweigh the potential beneﬁts of stronger patent
protection rights. Thus, in contrast to what suggested in Hypothe-
sis 1, the relationship between USPTO patents and ﬁrm value may
have grown weaker,  not stronger, over time.H2 (Declining USPTO patent quality). Over time, EPO patents
have become more strongly related to ﬁrm value than USPTO
patents.
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Two additional points are worth emphasizing. First, as discussed
bove, patent quality in the U.S. may  have declined more in new
echnology areas such as biotechnology, software and business
ethods than in more traditional areas (Barton, 2000; Hall, 2007).
hus, changes in the importance of USPTO patents over time may
ot be uniform across sectors. We  will distinguish between differ-
nt technology sectors in the empirical part.
Second, because the economic signiﬁcance of patents varies
remendously, simple patent counts may  be very noisy proxies for
he value of a ﬁrm’s technology. In the empirical part, we will use
orward citations to control for the quality of patented inventions.11
ecause our discussion suggests that USPTO patents are more het-
rogeneous in their quality than EPO patents (and, in particular,
hat they exhibit a longer tail at the lower end of the quality distri-
ution), we expect citation-weighing to strengthen especially the
ffect of USPTO patents.
. Data
This paper combines data from three sources: (i) M&A  data from
homson SDC Platinum, (ii) information on patents from the United
tates Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce (USPTO), and (iii) information
n patents from the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO).
We drop M&A  deals that do not report information on value, net
otal assets and acquired stakes. We  also drop deals where the tar-
et ﬁrm is not from an OECD country, because patent law may  vary
ubstantially between developed and developing countries. This
eaves us with 30,306 deals. 40% of the targets are American, 20%
re British, 7% are Japanese, and the remaining are from other West
uropean countries. We  match these ﬁrms to our patent datasets.
rior to the acquisition completion year, 4,643 ﬁrms have at least
ne patent in the USPTO or EPO.
Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics for the main variables
sed in our analysis. Firm value is computed as the ratio between
ransaction value and acquired stakes. The average target ﬁrm is
alued at $228 million, has $118 million in total assets, generates
138 million in annual sales, and makes $27 million in proﬁts. Two
eparate patent stocks are constructed: one for USPTO patents and
nother for EPO patents. We  include only patents that are granted
rior to the acquisition completion year. Stocks are computed using
he perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of 15
ercent. To control for patent quality, we also construct citation-
eighed stocks by weighing each patent by the number of citations
t receives (excluding self-citations) divided by the average num-
er of citations received by all other patents that are granted by the
ame patent ofﬁce in the same year. For each patent, we include
nly citations from other patents that are granted by the same
atent ofﬁce. That is, for USPTO patents, we only include citations
rom USPTO patents, and for EPO patents we only include citations
rom EPO patents. Finally, we construct an aggregate patent mea-
ure – total patent stock – which is simply the sum of USPTO and
PO patent stocks for each ﬁrm. The average patenting ﬁrm (a ﬁrm
ith at least one patent from the USPTO or EPO) has a stock of 14
SPTO patents (a median of 3), and 8 EPO patents (a median of 1).
11 Since the landmark work of Trajtenberg (1990), citation-weighed patent indexes
ave been shown to be strongly correlated with the social value of innovations
Trajtenberg, 1990), peer evaluation of their technical importance (Albert et al.,
991), renewal decisions (Harhoff et al., 1999; Thomas, 1999), and ﬁrm value
Belenzon, 2012; Bloom and Van Reenen, 2002; Deng et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2005;
irschey and Richardson, 2004). Hall et al. (2005), in particular, ﬁnd that investors
re able to accurately forecast the expected value of patented inventions, as it is
ater conﬁrmed by future citations. An alternative way  to control for patent quality
ould have been to estimate the private value of patents using annual renewal fees,
s  in Schankerman and Pakes (1986). Policy 42 (2013) 1496– 1510 1499
Since our focus is on how the relationship between patent-
ing and acquisition value has changed over time, Table 2 presents
descriptive statistics across time periods. The sample includes both
patenting and non-patenting target ﬁrms. We  split the sample into
six time periods. Average ﬁrm value is quite stable over time. Aver-
age value is $233 million for the deals completed in the period
1985–1990, and $249 million for the deals completed in the period
2005–2007. On the other hand, there is a substantial rise in Tobin’s
q – the ratio between value and assets – over time. Average Tobin’s
q is 3.4 for deals completed in 1985–1990, and is 4.9 for deals com-
pleted in 2005–2007. Thus intangible assets such as knowledge
appear to have become more important over time.
Table 3 examines how key characteristics of target ﬁrms have
changed over time. On average, 92% of patenting ﬁrms have at least
one USPTO patent, and 72% have at least one EPO patent. Over time,
the share of ﬁrms that patent in the USPTO declines but remains
very high while the share of ﬁrms that patent in the EPO increases
substantially from 56% in 1985 to about 77% in 2007. There is a
sharp increase in acquisition value in the period 1995–1998, but
these high values subsequently return to the overall sample mean.
Thus, there is no clear pattern regarding how ﬁrm value in these
acquisition deals has changed over time. Tobin’s q, on the other
hand, increases substantially over time, albeit in a non-monotonic
way  (it also peaks in 1998). The share of non-American acquisitions
also changes substantially over time (not reported in a table). In the
whole sample 40% of the acquisitions involve American targets, yet
this ﬁgures falls from around 69% in 1985 to about a quarter of the
deals in 2007. We discuss how this issue may affect the interpre-
tation of our ﬁnding in the next section and when presenting the
estimation results.
A fact that emerges clearly from our statistics is that valuations
were very high during the 1995–1998 period. The most likely expla-
nation for these high valuations is the exuberance that affected
investors and stock markets during the dot-com bubble years. This
bubble started in March 1995 with the excitement occasioned by
Netscape’s initial public offering, and terminated in 2000–2001
with the collapse of the NASDAQ Composite index (however, the
American economy started losing speed since 1999). To account for
possibly inﬂated corporate valuations during this period, in the rest
of the analysis (as in Table 1), we  will report separate estimations
for the periods 1995–1998 and 1999–2001, which correspond to
the boom and bust of the dot-com bubble.
4. Econometric analysis
We  estimate the following speciﬁcation for the value of target
ﬁrms, both for the whole sample and for different time periods.12
ln Valueit = ˇ0 ln Assetsit + ˇ1 ln(1 + PatUSit−1)
+ ˇ2 ln(1 + PatEUit−1) + t + i + cc + εi. (1)
Valueit is the value of target ﬁrm i at acquisition completion
year t and is computed as transaction value over acquired equity.
Assetsit is total net assets. PatUSit−1 and PatEUit−1 are, respectively,
target ﬁrm i’s USPTO and EPO patent stocks prior to the acquisi-
tion completion year. t, i and cc are complete sets of dummies for
acquisition completion years, two digit target industry SIC codes,
and target country. εi is an iid error term. Our main interest is the
way  the coefﬁcients ˇ1 and ˇ2 change over time. We  investigate
this in two ways: by interacting USPTO and EPO patent stocks with
period dummies, and by estimating separate speciﬁcations for dif-
ferent time periods. Because changes in the quality of USPTO and
12 Lerner (1995) estimates a similar speciﬁcation.
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Table  1
Summary statistics for main variables.
Variable # acquisitions Mean Std. dev. Distribution
10th 50th 90th
Target value ($, mm)  30,306 228 1,102 5 60 576
Net  assets ($, mm)  30,306 118 1,890 7 30 281
Tobin’s q ($, mm)  30,306 4.0 4.9 0.7 2.1 10.2
Sales  ($, mm) 26,245 138 197 4 52 416
Proﬁts  ($, mm)  21,714 27 64 −2 7 79
%  of share acquired 30,306 0.58 0.42 0.04 0.71 1
Total  patent stock, count 4,643 22 194 0.7 4 42
Total  patent stock, cite 4,643 21 161 0.4 4 43
USPTO patent stock, count 4,643 14.4 142.9 0 2.6 25.5
USPTO patent stock, citation-weighed 4,643 13.9 98.6 0.2 2.0 27.9
EPO patent stock, count 4,643 7.7 54.3 0.5 1.1 14.5
EPO  patent stock, citation-weighed 4,643 7.5 64.8 0.3 0.9 13.5
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the main variable used in the estimation. The sample includes M&A  transactions from SDC Platinum between in the period
1985–2007. Firm value is the ratio between total deal value and acquired equity. Tobin’s q is the ratio between ﬁrm value and assets. Patent values are reported for ﬁrms
with  at least one USPTO or EPO patent. We weigh patents by citations by dividing the number of citations they receive by the average number of citations received by all
patents  that are granted by the same patent ofﬁce in the same year. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
Table  2
Summary statistics for main variables for different time periods.
Variable 1985–1990
(4,770 deals)
1991–1994
(6,287 deals)
1995–1998
(6,287 deals)
1999–2001
(4,890 deals)
2002–2004
(2,694 deals)
2005–2007
(5,420 deals)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Firm value ($, mm)  233 72 194 37 222 64 262 73 204 56 249 74
Net  assets ($, mm)  108 37 154 19 92 31 103 33 110 38 126 29
Tobin’s q ($, mm) 3.4 2.1 3.7 1.9 3.9 2.1 4.4 2.1 3.0 1.5 4.9 2.7
Sales  ($, mm)  167 74 123 40 120 42 143 55 146.4 60.3 141.8 58.2
Proﬁts ($, mm)  42 15 23 5 27 7 27 8 22.9 5.2 23.5 5.4
%  of share acquired 42.9 78.1 61.3 56.3 54.7 55.3 1.0 65.7 56.5 51.3 58.2 62.3
USPTO patent stock, count 18.5 3.9 12.4 3.1 10.5 2.7 11.9 2.0 29.4 1.9 9.8 1.6
USPTO  patent stock, citation-weighed 18.3 3.8 14.0 2.5 13.0 2.2 11.0 1.4 21.6 1.1 8.0 1.1
EPO  patent stock, count 7.3 0.4 8.1 1.4 6.0 1.2 7.5 1.0 12.0 1.2 7.5 1.3
EPO  patent stock, citation-weighed 6.9 0.3 7.6 1.1 5.5 1.0 7.1 0.8 13.5 1.0 7.4 1.2
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the main variable used in the estimation by main periods. The sample includes M&A  transactions from SDC Platinum between
in  the period 1985–2007. Firm value is the ratio between total deal value and acquired equity. Patent data from the USPTO cover the period 1975–2007, and patents data
from  the EPO cover the period 1979–2007. We weight patents by citations by dividing the number of citations they receive by the average number of citations received by
all  patents granted in the same year.
Table 3
Patenting ﬁrms across years.
Year # deals Firm value Tobin’s q % Patent in the USPTO % Patent in the EPO
1985 52 388.1 2.3 100.0 55.8
1986  98 510.8 3.0 98.0 62.2
1987  134 322.6 3.1 98.5 62.7
1988  187 319.1 2.4 95.2 62.0
1989  227 381.2 3.1 95.2 66.1
1990  216 393.4 3.1 94.0 72.2
1991  189 275.7 2.9 91.5 69.8
1992  186 278.8 3.0 94.1 75.8
1993  222 278.0 3.9 89.2 73.9
1994  280 254.9 3.6 94.3 71.4
1995  253 466.7 4.2 96.0 71.1
1996  282 312.6 3.9 94.3 69.5
1997  285 390.3 5.0 96.1 73.3
1998  86 639.5 4.3 94.2 67.4
1999  336 275.3 4.2 90.8 73.8
2000  211 306.2 4.1 92.4 73.5
2001  137 213.0 3.3 93.4 74.5
2002  229 296.4 2.9 90.8 73.8
2003  203 179.8 2.8 91.6 77.8
2004  30 598.9 4.0 93.3 73.3
2005  246 308.0 4.6 85.0 76.8
2006  357 342.7 3.9 82.6 78.2
2007  197 358.1 3.6 83.2 76.6
Total  4,643 329.8 3.6 91.9 72.1
Notes: This table reports the number of patenting ﬁrms for each year in our sample. We include only ﬁrms that have at least one patent in USPTO or EPO by their acquisition
year.  Firm value is the ratio between total deal value and acquired equity. Tobin’s q is the ratio between ﬁrm value and assets. % patent in the USPTO (EPO) is the percentage
of  ﬁrms that have at least one patent in the USPTO (EPO) out of all patenting ﬁrms in the same year.
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PO patents may  in part drive our results, we will also compare the
stimates ˇ1 and ˇ2 for speciﬁcations where patents are weighed
y citations and speciﬁcations where patents are not weighed by
itations.13
There are a number of important potential biases that may  affect
ur estimations which are worth discussing before presenting the
esults.
A feature of our sample is that its ﬁrm composition changes from
ne year to another. This leaves our results sensitive to unobserved
eterogeneity bias. A concern might be, for instance, that ﬁrms that
hoose to patent in the EPO in the late sample period may  be, on
verage, of higher (unobserved) quality than ﬁrms that patent in
he EPO in the beginning of the sample period. This means that
ater in the sample period the correlation between EPO patents and
nobserved ﬁrm quality is positive, causing an upward bias in ˇ2.
e can check whether this concern is likely to affect our estimates
y comparing observed deal characteristics for early and later EPO
atentees. For ﬁrms that patent in the EPO in the ﬁrst estimation
eriod, 1985–1990, average deal value is $395 million, Tobin’s q is
.9, sales are $242 million, and proﬁts are $63 million. For ﬁrms that
atent in the EPO in the last sample period (2005–2007), average
alue is lower at $370 million, but Tobin’s q is higher at 4.2. Sales are
imilar to the early period level at 229, but proﬁts are much lower
t $33 million. From this comparison, it is not clear whether earlier
PO patentees are of lower quality than later ones. Interestingly, we
o ﬁnd that that later EPO patentees beneﬁt from higher Tobin’s q as
ompared to early EPO patentees. This is consistent with the view
hat knowledge assets for these ﬁrms account for a greater portion
f ﬁrm value. Our estimation results which are presented below are
onsistent with this interpretation.
Another potential source of sample selection is industry com-
osition. In the later period of the sample we observe more
iotechnology and information technology acquisitions than in ear-
ier periods. If the impact of patents on ﬁrm valuation varies across
ndustries, then our key estimates could be biased. Controlling
or industry is also important because, as our discussion suggests,
atent quality may  have declined more in some industries than
thers. To check the sensitivity of our results to industry varia-
ion, we report our main estimation results separately for the main
nnovative industries in our sample.14
Lastly, we observe a sharp decline in the share of American tar-
ets in our sample. While in the early periods about 50 percent of
argets are American, this percentage drops to about 20 percent in
he late sample periods. A similar pattern emerges when looking at
atenting ﬁrms only (from 60 to 30 percent). This could affect our
esults, for instance if USPTO patents matter mostly to American
rms, but also non-American ﬁrms patent at the USPTO. Thus, when
resenting the econometric results, we also discuss the robust-
ess of our ﬁndings to splitting the sample between American and
on-American targets.
13 An important caveat is in order. A premise of our analysis is that patent citations
re  a useful proxy for patent quality. However, because the citations a patent receives
ccumulate over time, patent quality is likely to be measured with error toward the
nd of the estimation period. If the EPO provides some quality reassurance because
ew  “bad” patents are granted by the EPO, then ˇ2 is likely to be higher (and ˇ1 lower)
n  the last years of the estimation period even if patents are weighted by citations,
imply because of citation-truncation. Yet, ﬁnding that USPTO patents become less
aluable before the end of the estimation period (as we  do, see Table 5, columns 4–5
nd 10–11) suggests that truncation is not likely to completely drive our results.
14 We also checked how the representation of different industries changes
hroughout our sample period. We  focused on drugs and chemicals because patent-
ng is very important in these industries; thus changes in representation over time
ave the potential to affect our estimates. We  did not ﬁnd substantial variation in
he  representation of these industries in our sample over time. In 1985, 4.6% of the
eals are in drugs and chemicals. In 2007, the proportion is 5.0%. Policy 42 (2013) 1496– 1510 1501
5. Estimation results
5.1. “Horse-race” estimation
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the complete sample
period. We  start with patent measures not weighed by citations
(thus, we  use the number of patents each ﬁrm holds when con-
structing the EPO and USPTO patent stocks). Column 1 includes
logged total patent stock (the log of the sum of USPTO and EPO
patent stocks). The elasticity estimate of acquisition value with
respect to total patent stock is 0.117 (a standard error of 0.007).
Obtaining an elasticity estimate allows us to calculate the increase
in acquisition value as a response to a unitary increase in patent
stock. For this computation, we use the average acquisition value
and average patent stock values for patenting ﬁrms in the sample.
The elasticity estimate from column 1 implies that increasing total
patent stock by one is associated with a $1.2 million increase in
acquisition value.
Columns 2 and 3 add the stocks of USPTO and EPO patents sep-
arately. In both cases the coefﬁcient estimates are large and highly
signiﬁcant. In column 4 we  estimate a “horse-race” between USPTO
and EPO patents. Including both measures in a single regression
results in a drop in both coefﬁcient estimates as compared to when
each variable is separately included. When both stocks are included,
the elasticity of acquisition value with respect to EPO patents is
almost twice as large as the elasticity with respect to USPTO patents.
Based on the estimates from column 4, raising the EPO patent stock
by one unit is associated with a $2.6 million increase in ﬁrm value,
compared to a $0.8 million increase for the USPTO patent stock.
Columns 5–7 report initial robustness checks for the above
results. In column 5 we  exclude deals in information technology
and business services because patentability requirements in these
ﬁelds vary substantially between the U.S. and Europe. The esti-
mates are not sensitive to removing these industries. In column
6 we include only patenting ﬁrms to ensure that our results are not
driven by comparing patenting to non-patenting ﬁrms. If selection
into patenting is correlated with an omitted variable that is related
to value, then our patenting variables would be upward-biased. We
ﬁnd the same pattern of results when focusing only on ﬁrms with
at least one patent. In column 7 we include only deals that are clas-
siﬁed as “high-tech” in SDC. Our concern here is that our estimates
may  be driven by comparing high-tech deals (where patent valua-
tions may  be high) to low-tech deals (where patent valuations may
be low). The estimates remain stable.
Columns 8–14 present the estimation results when controlling
for patent quality using forward citations. Controlling for citations
proves important for USPTO patents, but much less so for EPO
patents. This is expected under the assumption that USPTO patents
are of greater quality heterogeneity than EPO patents. Controlling
for citations increases the coefﬁcient estimate for USPTO patents
by nearly 30% (from 0.056 to 0.072). Our estimates imply that a
unitary increase in citation-weighed EPO and USPTO patent stocks
is associated with $2.3 and $1.1 million increase in acquisition
value, respectively. These estimates still imply large differences
in the value of USPTO and EPO patents; however, the difference
is considerably lower than when we do not control for citations.
Another interesting result is the robustness of the USPTO coefﬁ-
cient in columns 12–14 where we  perform the same sensitivity
checks as reported in columns 5–7.
Comparing our ﬁndings to previous estimates is challenging due
to the heterogeneity of methods used and the fact that we are
not aware of other studies that focus on acquisition value. These
caveats notwithstanding, we  provide a few comparisons to lead-
ing studies in the ﬁeld. First, we  compare our estimates to Hall
et al. (2005). Like us, they use ﬁrm value to infer patent value
(however, we  use acquisition value, while they use stock market
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Table 4
Patents and ﬁrm value.
Dependent variable: ln(Firm value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Patent count (not weighed by citations) Patents weighed by citations
All All All All Exc. IT ﬁrms At least one patent Only High-Tech All All All All Exc. IT ﬁrms At least one patent Only High-Tech
ln(1 + Total Patent Stock)t−1 0.117** 0.122**
(0.007) (0.007)
ln(1 + USPTO Patent
Stock)t−1
0.117** 0.056** 0.056** 0.048** 0.050** 0.125** 0.075** 0.076** 0.072** 0.072**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
ln(1  + EPO Patent
Stock)t−1
0.148** 0.100** 0.093** 0.090** 0.097** 0.152** 0.086** 0.079** 0.080** 0.080**
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
ln(Net  assets) 0.713** 0.714** 0.715** 0.713** 0.727** 0.716** 0.710** 0.712** 0.714** 0.715** 0.713** 0.727** 0.709** 0.709**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Two-digit  industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  target dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquisition year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.680 0.679 0.679 0.679 0.689 0.683 0.653 0.680 0.679 0.679 0.680 0.690 0.653 0.653
Observations 30,306 30,306 30,306 30,306 26,532 4,643 24,010 30,306 30,306 30,306 30,306 26,532 24,010 24,010
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions that examine the relationship between patent stocks and ﬁrm value. The sample includes M&A transactions from SDC Platinum between in the period 1985–2007. Patent
data  from the USPTO covers the period 1975–2007, and patents data from the EPO covers the period 1979–2007. In Columns 8–14 we weigh patents by citations. We divide the number of citations they receive by the average
number  of citations received by all patents granted by the same patent ofﬁce in the same year. Columns 5 and 12 exclude ﬁrms the operate in ﬁelds of information technologies or business services. Robust standard errors are in
brackets.
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Fig. 1. (a) Time-varying coefﬁcient estimates on USPTO and EPO patent stocks.
and 2005–2007); however, USPTO patent coefﬁcients certainly
did not rise. The results appear to be more consistent with theS. Belenzon, A. Patacconi / Res
ata). They report a citations elasticity of about 0.03, while we ﬁnd
 much higher (citation-weighed) elasticity of 0.122. It is impor-
ant to note, however, that Hall et al. (2005) also control for R&D
 information which we do not have. Thus, our estimated elastic-
ty is likely to be picking the R&D effect as well (for instance, an
ncrease in non-patented knowledge). Interestingly, our estimates
ecome much closer to those of Hall et al. (2005) when consider-
ng the highly-cited patents in their sample, and actually become
ower than their estimates for ﬁrms with extremely large num-
ers of citations per patent. Our estimates are also much higher
hat previous estimates obtained from patent renewal data. For
xample, using renewal data on European patents, Pakes (1986)
nd Schankerman and Pakes (1986) report very low value esti-
ates ranging from $847 to $19,124 (in 1980 prices). However, the
enewal approach only captures the “patent premium” – the incre-
ent to the value of an innovation which is realized by patenting
t – not the overall value of a patented invention. The latter is what
e measure. Estimates using renewal data may  also be downward
iased because extremely valuable patents may  not be properly
ccounted for (Harhoff et al., 2003; Arora et al., 2008). Our estimates
re much closer to those obtained by Gambardella et al. (2008)
sing the comprehensive PATVAL survey on the value of European
atents. The PATVAL survey directly asked for information of the
erceived value of patents, rather than trying to infer value using
ifferent estimation techniques. The authors report very high value
stimates, with average patent value of above EUR10 million, and
 median of EU650 thousand. Our estimates are quite close to their
urvey median value.
.2. Variation over time
Next, we study how the value of USPTO and EPO patents has
hanged over time. For this purpose we estimate several “horse-
ace” speciﬁcations for different periods in our sample. The time
eriods are constructed trying to even the distribution of number of
eals over time, while also isolating some speciﬁc historical factors
the dot-com bubble in 1995–1998 and its burst in 2000–2001) that
re evident in our descriptive statistics.
Table 5 presents the estimation results. Two speciﬁcations
re provided: ﬂexible speciﬁcations where we  split the sample
y periods, and speciﬁcations where we include an exhaustive
et of interactions between the period dummies and USPTO and
PO patent stocks. We  begin with the case when patents are
ot weighed by citations (columns 1–6). A clear pattern emerges.
SPTO patents are important in the ﬁrst sample period 1985–1990,
ut subsequently have no signiﬁcant effect on acquisition value,
xcept than in the dot-com bubble years 1995–1998. By contrast,
he effect of EPO patents is always large and signiﬁcant from 1991
o 2007 (columns 1–5).
Estimation using a pooled regression (column 6) conﬁrms these
esults. EPO patents have a stable effect on value: we cannot reject
he hypothesis that the EPO period interactions are different from
ne another (p-value = 0.82). Yet, we can strongly reject the hypoth-
sis that they are jointly equal to zero (p-value < 0.001). On the
ther hand, USPTO patents do not have a robust effect on acqui-
ition value, and starting from 1991, with the exception of the
995–1998 period, their effect on acquisition value is statistically
ero. The importance of EPO patents, relative to USPTO patents,
learly increases over time. In the ﬁrst sample period, the differ-
nce between EPO and USPTO coefﬁcient estimates is 0.017. The
ame difference in the ﬁnal sample period is 0.120.
A similar pattern emerges when patents are weighed by cita-
ions (columns 7–12). USPTO patents matter for value in the ﬁrst
hree sample periods (1985–1998), but their effect completely
isappears in the 1999–2007 period. In contrast, EPO patents,
hich do not have a signiﬁcant effect on value in the ﬁrst periodPatents are no weighed by citations. (b) Time-varying coefﬁcient estimates on USPTO
and  EPO patent stocks. Patents are not weighed by citations.
(1985–1990), become the dominant technology indicator in the late
sample periods (1999–2007).15
Comparing weighed and un-weighed speciﬁcations shows that
citation-weighing bolsters the effect of the USPTO patents in the
early sample periods. That is what one would expect if the qual-
ity of USPTO patents is very heterogeneous. However, even in the
citation-weighed speciﬁcations, the coefﬁcient on USPTO patents
drops to zero in the late sample periods. A possible explanation is
that because citations accumulate over time, patent quality may be
measured with large error near the end of the sample period. Thus
citation-weighing may  not be a particularly good way to control
for patent quality in the last few years of our sample. The effect of
EPO patents, by contrast, always remains very strong, both in the
un-weighed and weighed regressions. Fig. 1 graphically illustrates
the results from columns 6 and 12.
Overall, the results do not support the hypothesis that stronger
patent protection rights led to higher valuations for USPTO and EPO
patents (Hypothesis 1). There is some evidence that EPO patents
became more valuable in the last two  sample periods (2002–200415 Total patents stock – the sum of USPTO and EPO stocks – has a very stable effect
over time (not presented in the table). The coefﬁcient estimate on the (citation-
weighed) total patents stock in the period 1985–1990 is 0.102, compared to a value
of 0.122 in the 2002–2007 period.
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Table 5
Patents and ﬁrm value over time.
Dependent variable: ln(Firm value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Patent count (not weighed by citations) Patents weighed by citations
1985–1990 1991–1994 1995–1998 1999–2001 2002–2004 2005–2007 All 1985–1990 1991–1994 1995–1998 1999–2001 2002–2004 2005–2007 All
ln(1 + USPTO Patent
Stock)t−1
0.073** 0.033 0.103** 0.032 0.032 0.003 0.084** 0.064** 0.125** 0.056 0.041 0.014
(0.018) (0.030) (0.030) (0.036) (0.052) (0.034) (0.017) (0.028) (0.030) (0.033) (0.047) (0.034)
ln(1  + EPO Patent
Stock)t−1
0.056 0.125** 0.087** 0.107** 0.134* 0.149** 0.043 0.103** 0.069* 0.094** 0.138* 0.143**
(0.023) (0.033) (0.030) (0.041) (0.063) (0.039) (0.024) (0.033) (0.031) (0.038) (0.059) (0.039)
ln(1  + USPTO Patent Stock)t−1 ×
1985 ≤ Year ≤ 1990 0.046** 0.055**
(0.017) (0.016)
1991  ≤ Year ≤ 1994 0.036 0.059*
(0.030) (0.027)
1995  ≤ Year ≤ 1998 0.169** 0.185**
(0.028) (0.028)
1999  ≤ Year ≤ 2001 0.053 0.099**
(0.033) (0.031)
2002  ≤ Year ≤ 2004 −0.003 −0.000
(0.048) (0.044)
2005  ≤ Year ≤ 2007 −0.012 −0.000
(0.033) (0.033)
ln(1  + EPO Patents Stock)t−1 ×
1985 ≤ Year ≤ 1990 0.063** 0.053*
(0.024) (0.025)
1991  ≤ Year ≤ 1994 0.131** 0.114**
(0.033) (0.032)
1995  ≤ Year ≤ 1998 0.086** 0.072**
(0.030) (0.031)
1999  ≤ Year ≤ 2001 0.092* 0.061**
(0.040) (0.038)
2002  ≤ Year ≤ 2004 0.139** 0.144**
(0.059) (0.054)
2005  ≤ Year ≤ 2007 0.118** 0.110**
(0.038) (0.037)
ln(Net  assets) 0.734** 0.711** 0.726** 0.711** 0.751** 0.674** 0.713** 0.734** 0.711** 0.725** 0.711** 0.751** 0.674** 0.713**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.004)
Two-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country  target dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquisition year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.726 0.693 0.686 0.671 0.683 0.664 0.680 0.726 0.693 0.686 0.671 0.683 0.664 0.680
Observations 4,770 6,287 6,245 4,890 2,694 5,420 30,306 4,770 6,287 6,245 4,890 2,694 5,420 30,306
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions that examine the relationship between patents and ﬁrm value in different time periods. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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ypothesis that USPTO patent quality and valuations declined over
ime (Hypothesis 2).
Using the estimates from column 13, we can again calculate
atent values for different time periods separately for USPTO and
PO patents. In the ﬁrst estimation period, 1985–1990, a unitary
ncrease in USPTO patent stock leads to a $765 thousand increase
n acquisition value. In the third period, 1995–1998, where USPTO
atents seem to be the most valuable, the same unitary increase
eads to a $2.8 million rise in acquisition value. This value, how-
ver, drops to zero in the 2002–2007 period. EPO patents exhibit
 much more stable correlation with acquisition value. In the ﬁrst
stimation period, 1985–1990, a unitary increase in the stock of EPO
atents leads to a $1.4 million increase in value. This value rises to
3.1 million in the second period 1991–1994, which is the same
alue that is obtained in the last estimation period (2005–2007).
In unreported speciﬁcations, we repeated the analysis in Table 5
or patenting ﬁrms only, for ﬁrms classiﬁed as high-tech by SDC,
nd excluding IT and business services. The same pattern of results
ontinues to hold.16
. Robustness
The previous analysis uncovered two important ﬁndings: (i)
ver time, EPO patents become more valuable relative to USPTO
atents, and (ii) the effect of USPTO patents on acquisition value
ompletely disappears in the late sample periods. In this section
e explore the robustness of these ﬁndings by splitting the sample
ccording to different criteria. Due to the fewer degrees-of-freedom
ssociated with such experimentation, the sample is split into
ewer time periods.
.1. Target ﬁrm size
Patents play a particularly important role in the start-up phase of
 ﬁrm’s life (Long, 2002). They protect young, small ﬁrms from com-
etition by industry leaders (Teece, 1986). To potential investors,
hey provide “evidence that the company is well managed, is
t a certain stage in development, and has deﬁned and carved
ut a market niche” (Lemley, 2001, pp. 1505–1506). Not surpris-
ngly, therefore, venture capitalists, business angels and corporate
nvestors increasingly base their investment decisions on IP con-
iderations (Kortum and Lerner, 2000).
Table 6 examines the extent to which our results are driven by
ifferences in target ﬁrm size. We  classify a ﬁrm as small if its sales
all in the lowest quartile of the sales distribution, and as large if
ts sales fall in the highest quartile. Consistent with the idea that
atents matter the most for small ﬁrms, our results hold only in
he small-ﬁrm sample. For large ﬁrms we ﬁnd no evidence that
atents (either USPTO or EPO) matter for valuation, and there is no
mportant temporal variation in their importance. By contrast, EPO
atents strongly correlate with the valuation of small ﬁrms, espe-
ially in the last sample period when they are almost as important
or valuation as net assets. The effect of USPTO patents on small
16 We also more closely examine the rise in USPTO patent values during the bubble
ears 1995–1998. The rise in USPTO patent values is robust to removing any year
n  this period. For instance, when removing year 1998 (an outlier in terms of deal
alues as shown in Table 3), the coefﬁcient estimate on USPTO patents (citation-
eighed) is 0.125 and the coefﬁcient estimate on EPO patents is 0.063. Splitting the
ample by American and non-American targets shows that the rise in USPTO patent
alues is driven by non-U.S. targets. For American targets, the USPTO coefﬁcient
stimate is 0.070; the same estimate for non-American targets is 0.227. Lastly, the
oefﬁcient estimate on USPTO patents is about 50% larger in the 1995–1998 period
or  targets in the information technology ﬁeld than in all the other industries in the
ame period. Ta
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rms’ acquisition value, while strong in the ﬁrst sample period,
ubsequently disappears.
.2. Target-acquirer similarity
This section explores the extent to which our ﬁndings are driven
y similarities between acquiring and target ﬁrms. We  focus on two
imensions of similarity: whether the acquiring and target ﬁrms
perate in the same two-digit SIC code (product market similar-
ty), and whether the acquiring and target ﬁrms operate in the same
ountry (geographic proximity). We  conjecture that, if the EPO label
rovides a stronger signal of quality than the USPTO label, then EPO
atents should be particularly valuable, relative to USPTO patents,
n between-industry and between-country deals. In these deals, in
act, asymmetric information is likely to be particularly prominent,
s acquiring ﬁrms may  lack speciﬁc industry knowledge or knowl-
dge about local conditions. Thus, the quality certiﬁcation provided
y the EPO label may  be especially valuable (Akerlof, 1970).
Tables 7 and 8 focus on product market similarity and geo-
raphic proximity, respectively. Table 7 segregates within- and
etween-industry acquisitions using the two-digit SIC codes of the
cquiring and target ﬁrms. We  ﬁnd that over time EPO patents
ecome more important, relative to USPTO patents, for between-
ndustry acquisitions relative to within-industry acquisitions. This
s true regardless of whether patents are weighed, although much
tronger USPTO effects are obtained when patents are weighed.
able 8 segregates domestic and cross-border acquisitions. Here,
SPTO patents matter only for value in domestic deals and the ear-
ier period. By contrast, EPO patents have a strong effect on value
oth in domestic and cross-border acquisitions. The rise in EPO
atent values, however, is particularly pronounced in cross-border
cquisitions.
Overall, our ﬁndings indicate that EPO patents have become
specially important in situations where asymmetric information
s most likely to be substantial (i.e., between-industry and cross-
ountry deals). This suggests the possibility that the EPO label may
rovide some form of quality reassurance. Exploring this issue fur-
her is an interesting direction for future research.
.3. Target ﬁrm nationality
An important concern is that our temporal patterns may  be
riven by changes in sample composition. Most importantly, the
roportion of European targets in our sample rises substantially
ver time.17 If USPTO patents are less important for European ﬁrms
ecause they mostly sell in European markets, then a pattern of
eclining USPTO patent values might be observed. To mitigate this
oncern, Table 9 splits the sample by target ﬁrm nationality (in this
able patents are always weighed by citations). We  ﬁnd that, for
merican targets, USPTO patents have a large effect on value in the
arlier sample period, but this effect completely disappears by the
nd of the sample period. EPO patents, on the other hand, experi-
nce an opposite pattern: they have no effect on value in the earlier
ample period, and a large effect in the later period. For European
argets, the pattern is similar. USPTO patents are only important
or value in the earlier sample periods, while EPO patents have a
trong and signiﬁcant effect in both early and late periods (with
uch stronger late-period effects). Thus, our patterns – and in par-
icular the pattern of declining USPTO effects – do not seem to be
17 There is a strong “home-bias” effect in acquisitions. 84 percent of acquisitions
y  American ﬁrms are American, and almost all acquisitions by European ﬁrms are
uropean. These patterns are stable over time. Ta
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Table 8
Domestic- vs. cross-border acquisitions.
Dependent  variable:  ln(Firm  value)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)
Patent  count  (not  weighed  by  citations)  Patents  weighed  by citations
Domestic  acquisitions  Cross-border  acquisitions  Domestic  acquisitions  Cross-border  acquisitions
All  1985–1998  1999–2001  2002–2007  All  1985–1998  1999–2001  2002–2007  All  1985–1998  1999–2001  2002–2007  All  1985–1998  1999–2001  2002–2007
ln(1  +  USPTO  Patent  Stock)t−1 0.066** 0.067** 0.045  0.022  0.006  0.015  −0.014  −0.041  0.086** 0.089** 0.066  0.034  0.035  0.043  0.033  −0.048
(0.013) (0.015)  (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.044)  (0.101)  (0.068)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.049)  (0.082)  (0.070)
ln(1 +  EPO  Patent  Stock)t−1 0.093** 0.092** 0.114** 0.131** 0.155** 0.136** 0.114  0.212** 0.080** 0.074** 0.105** 0.127** 0.134** 0.114* 0.073  0.217**
(0.015)  (0.017)  (0.045)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.047)  (0.119)  (0.076)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.042)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.051)  (0.105)  (0.074)
ln(Net assets) 0.718** 0.726** 0.709** 0.703** 0.655** 0.659** 0.660** 0.637** 0.717** 0.726** 0.709** 0.703** 0.655** 0.659** 0.659** 0.637**
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.025)
Two-digit industry  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Country target  dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Acquisition year  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
R2 0.691 0.710  0.677  0.680  0.607  0.619  0.672  0.615  0.691  0.710  0.677  0.680  0.607  0.619  0.672  0.615
Observations 26,559  15,536  4,092  6,931  3,747  1,766  798  1,183  26,559  15,536  4,092  6,931  3,747  1,766  798  1,183
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions that examine the effect of patents on ﬁrm value for domestic vs. cross-border acquisitions. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 9
American- vs. European targets.
Dependent  variable:  ln(Firm  value)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)
Patent  count  (not  weighed  by  citations) Patents  weighed  by  citations
American  target European  target  American  target  European  target
All  1985–1998  1999–2001  2002–2007  All 1985–1998  1999–2001  2002–2007  All 1985–1998  1999–2001  2002–2007  All 1985–1998  1999–2001  2002–2007
ln(1  +  USPTO  Patent  Stock)t−1 0.041** 0.045** 0.007  0.031  0.056** 0.069** 0.070  −0.102  0.061** 0.071** 0.023  0.036  0.083** 0.095** 0.118* −0.123*
(0.016)  (0.018)  (0.054)  (0.047)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.064)  (0.058)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.059)  (0.062)
ln(1 +  EPO  Patent  Stock)t−1 0.105** 0.105** 0.145** 0.095* 0.101** 0.096** 0.064  0.216** 0.090** 0.084** 0.136** 0.096* 0.085** 0.077** 0.039  0.227**
(0.018)  (0.020)  (0.064)  (0.055)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.068)  (0.059)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.058)  (0.054)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.065)  (0.061)
ln(Net assets) 0.719** 0.744** 0.648** 0.684** 0.707** 0.699** 0.741** 0.700** 0.718** 0.742** 0.648** 0.684** 0.707** 0.699** 0.741** 0.700**
(0.007)  (0.008)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.010)
Two-digit industry  dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes
Country target  dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes
Acquisition year  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes
R2 0.675 0.713  0.563  0.652  0.694  0.697  0.739  0.688  0.676  0.713  0.563  0.652  0.694  0.697  0.740  0.688
Observations 12,001  8,170  1,866  1,965  14,655  8,067  2,476  4,112  12,001  8,170  1,866  1,965  14,655  8,067  2,476  4,112
Notes: This table reports the results of OLS regressions that examine the effect of patents on ﬁrm value. We split the sample depending on whether targets are American or European ﬁrms. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
* Signiﬁcant at 5%.
** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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riven by the growing proportion of European target ﬁrms in our
ample.18
.4. Industry variation
Patent protection varies considerably across industries. This
ariation can be driven by different legal patentability require-
ent or by differences in the nature of technology. To examine
ow the relationship between ﬁrm value and patents varies across
ndustries, we separately estimate our main speciﬁcation for the
ollowing industries: drugs and chemicals, electronics and comput-
rs, and prepackaged software. Drugs and chemicals are industries
here patent protection is very important. Electronics and comput-
rs are industries where innovation tends to require the integration
f many different pieces of knowledge and is often incremen-
al, with follow-up developments often rapidly displacing existing
roducts. Pre-packaged software is an interesting industry because
atentability requirements vary substantially between the United
tates and Europe. While in the U.S. advances in IT can be easily
atented, the patentability requirements for software are much
tricter in Europe, regardless of the quality of the invention.
The estimation results are summarized in Table 10. For target
rms that belong to the drug and chemical industries (columns
–3), our main ﬁndings are supported. In these industries, EPO
atents become more important over time, while the effect of
SPTO patents collapses in the late sample period. In computers
nd electronics, by contrast, both USPTO and EPO patents appear to
atter for value, with USPTO patent coefﬁcients having more pre-
ise estimates. In software, neither USPTO nor EPO patents appear
o matter for value. Thus, our results appear to be driven by the
rug and chemical sectors.
To better understand this result, we attempted to isolate the
ontribution of the biotechnology sector within the broader drug
nd chemical industries. For each of the 1390 drugs and chem-
cals deals in our sample, we used information from company
ebsites and other public sources to determine whether target
rms engaged in biotechnology research or production. There is
 widespread perception in fact that USPTO examination standards
ere quite lax in new technology ﬁelds such as genomics (Merrill
t al., 2004). About 40 percent of the target ﬁrms in our sample
re biotechnology ﬁrms.19 Our results indicate that, although the
alue of USPTO patents held by biotechnology ﬁrms dropped con-
iderably in the late sample period (from a coefﬁcient estimate of
.092 in column 5 to an estimate of −0.019 in column 6), so did the
alue of USPTO patents held by more traditional drugs and chem-
cals ﬁrms (from an estimate of 0.138 in column 8 to an estimate
f 0.037 in column 9). Thus, our results provide little support for
he conjecture that the decline in USPTO patent quality (as mea-
ured by the conditional correlation between USPTO patents and
rm value) was particularly driven by the biotechnology industry,
s opposed to the drug and chemical industries more generally.20
18 In unreported regressions, we also distinguish between deals where the acquirer
s  an American ﬁrm and deals where the acquirer is a European ﬁrm. Several inter-
sting results emerge from this analysis. First, there is a clear pattern of declining
SPTO effect, especially for acquisition where the acquiring ﬁrm is European. This
attern is not sensitive for citations weighing. Second, the effect of EPO patents is
enerally stable across periods, with the period 1999–2001 being an exception for
uropean acquirers. Third, comparing early to late sample periods, the effect of EPO
atents substantially increases for European acquires (from a coefﬁcients estimate
f  0.080 in 1985–1998 to an estimate of 0.221 in 2002–2007).
19 We  also attempted to isolate the contribution of the genomics subﬁeld. How-
ver,  very few targets in our sample (12) belong to that subﬁeld.
20 It is important to stress, however, that we can only distinguish between
iotechnology and non-biotechnology ﬁrms, not between biotechnology and non-
iotechnology patents. To the extent that traditional drugs companies possess large Ta
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provide some impetus to current efforts to raise patent quality
standards in the U.S.
21 Because patenting at the EPO is much more expensive than patenting at theS. Belenzon, A. Patacconi / Res
. Concluding remarks
Motivated by concerns about declining patent quality standards
n the U.S., this paper examines how the value of patent portfolios
as changed over time. We  examine more than 33,000 mergers
nd acquisitions deals between 1985 and 2007, and distinguish
etween American (USPTO) and European (EPO) patents. We  ﬁnd
hat, while the value of EPO patents has remained relatively sta-
le over this time period, the value of USPTO patents has declined
ubstantially and is essentially zero near the end of the sample
eriod. Our results are robust to weighing patents by citations and
re especially strong in between-industry and between-country
eals, suggesting that EPO patents may  provide some form of qual-
ty reassurance in transactions where asymmetric information is
mportant.
Recent accounts of the evolution of the patent system in America
nd Europe offer a key to interpret these results. According to these
ccounts, starting from the early 1980s, patents have become much
ore potent legal weapons but, especially in the U.S., they have also
ecome very easy to get (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). Our analysis sug-
ests that limited quality-control efforts by the USPTO, combined
ith the explosion of patent activity in recent years, have produced
ver time a very large number of USPTO patents that are essen-
ially worthless, both economically and as a signal of technological
trength. This trend may  eventually have been reﬂected in declin-
ng patent valuations (as documented by our analysis), despite the
trengthening of patent protection rights.
We stress, however, that this paper does not (and cannot)
irectly analyze the effect of changing IP regimes and examina-
ion standards on patent valuations. The institutional environment
an inﬂuence how patents are evaluated and valued; however, sev-
ral other factors also play a role. For instance, patent quality may
ave declined in the U.S., not because USPTO examination stan-
ards have declined, but because American ﬁrms have started to
atent increasingly more marginal inventions. Since USPTO patent
oefﬁcients did not particularly drop in an industry – biotechnology
 where examination standards have arguably been lax, this alter-
ative hypothesis deserves great consideration. Changing market
onditions can also have a large inﬂuence on patent valuations. In
he middle of the dot-com bubble (1995–1998), we ﬁnd very large
stimated values for USPTO patents, arguably the result of some
irrational exuberance.” We  cannot exclude that the subsequent
ower valuations we observe were not a reaction – and possibly an
ver-response – to the earlier exuberance.
Forecasting how patent values will change in the future is difﬁ-
ult not only because market conditions change, but also because
he institutional environment is constantly evolving. A major recent
eform is the America Invents Act passed by Congress in 2011.
mong its most important effects, this act replaces the traditional
.S. ﬁrst-to-invent system with a ﬁrst-to-ﬁle system and sets up a
ew postgrant review process. Assessing how these changes will
ffect USPTO patent quality is not straightforward. On the one
and, it is likely that the new review process will improve patent
uality by allowing more prior art to be brought to bear on a
ecision. On the other hand, some fear that a ﬁrst-to-ﬁle system
ay  give inventors strong incentives to ﬁle early, before an inven-
ion is fully developed. This may  have a negative effect on patent
uality.
There are three limitations to our analysis that should alsoe discussed. First, because our sample of ﬁrms changes from
ear to year, our results may  be subject to unobserved hetero-
eneity bias. Second, patents are a territorial right: a USPTO
ortfolios of biotechnology patents, our results may  be subject to large measurement
rror. Policy 42 (2013) 1496– 1510 1509
patent grants protection in the U.S., while an EPO patent poten-
tially grants protection in a wide range of European countries.
Thus, the time variation in patent valuations that we observe
may  be due to the changing importance of different geographi-
cal markets. Finally, globalization might have made “important”
patents even more valuable (important patents being those that
are granted in multiple jurisdictions). This effect might be cap-
tured by EPO patents since most ﬁrms in our sample patent in the
USPTO.
While these concerns cannot entirely be dismissed, we  con-
ducted several robustness tests to mitigate them. Sections 4 and
6.3 discuss a number of problems created by changing sample com-
position and conclude that our results are robust. On the changing
importance of geographical markets, we note that, since the 1980s,
real GDP has grown faster in the U.S. than in Europe (E.U. 15). This, if
anything, should have made American patents more valuable rela-
tive to EPO patents, not less. Finding the opposite makes our results
more striking. In unreported regressions, we also tested the “glob-
alization” hypothesis that patents granted in multiple jurisdictions
may  have become over time more valuable. We  created a “glob-
alization dummy” which receives the value of one for ﬁrms that
patent in both EPO and USPTO, and zero for all other ﬁrms. Our
results are robust to controlling for patenting in multiple jurisdic-
tions.
We believe that our ﬁndings may  be of interest to practition-
ers and researchers alike. Patent statistics are increasingly used by
practitioners to evaluate companies and divisions, thanks in part
to the pioneering efforts of Narin and coauthors (Deng et al., 1999;
Narin, 1995). Scholars have contributed to this endeavor by provid-
ing “quality-adjusted” patent-based measures of innovative effort
using citations (Trajtenberg, 1990), renewal data (Schankerman
and Pakes, 1986), number of claims in a patent application (Tong
and Frame, 1994), patent family size (Putnam, 1996), or combina-
tions of the above (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). This paper
suggests that USPTO and EPO patents are not homogeneous in
terms of their quality (economic and technical), and that average
quality across jurisdictions can change substantially over time. Dis-
tinguishing between USPTO and EPO patents appears to be crucial
for corporate evaluation purposes, above and beyond controlling
for patent quality as measured by citations.21
Our ﬁndings are also relevant to policy-makers. Commentators
have warned against the dangers of declining examination stan-
dards because, if applicants can get patents for obvious or existing
ideas, then patents could be used to harass, seek compensation
from, or even shut down legitimate businesses (Jaffe and Lerner,
2004). Firms may  even refuse to enter some technology sectors for
fear of litigation, with negative consequences for innovation and
growth (Lerner, 1995). However, assessing whether and to what
extent patent quality standards have actually declined has proved
to be difﬁcult (Merrill et al., 2004). This paper, by showing that
USPTO patent valuations have substantially declined in a period
when EPO patent valuations have remained essentially stable, mayUSPTO, the distinction between EPO and USPTO shares some similarities with the
renewal data approach. The renewal data approach assumes that patents that are
renewed for longer are more valuable because patentees were willing to incur the
associated renewal fees. In a similar fashion, EPO patents are likely to be on average
of  higher quality than USPTO patents, because EPO patentees are willing to pay
substantially higher patenting costs. How much higher these costs are depends,
among other factors, on the number European countries the patentee has applied
for:  the EPO is a unitary patent application system but not yet a unitary patent
system.
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ppendix A. Matching patent data
We  match the name of each patent applicant listed on the
atent document to the full name of a ﬁrm listed in Amadeus and
carus (about 22 million names). Our source of USPTO patents is
he 2007 version of the NBER patents and citations data archive.
or EPO patents, we use the 2007 publication of the PATSTAT
atabase, which is the standard source for European patent data.
his database contains all bibliographic data (including citations)
n all European patent applications and granted patents, from the
eginning of the EPO system in 1979 to the end of 2007.
Since we are interested only in matching patent applicants to
rms, we exclude applicant names that fall into the following cat-
gories: government agencies, universities, and individuals. We
dentify government agencies and universities by searching for a
et of identifying strings in their name. We  identify individuals
s patents where the assignee and the inventor name strings are
dentical.
The matching procedure follows two main steps. (i) Standardiz-
ng names of patent applicants. This involves replacing commonly
sed strings which symbolize the same thing, for example “Ltd.”
nd “Limited” in the UK. We  remove spaces between characters
nd transform all letters to capital letters. As an example, the name
British Nuclear Fuels Public Limited Company” becomes “BRITISH-
UCLEARFUELSPLC”. (ii) Name matching: match the standard
ames of the patent applicants with Amadeus ﬁrms. If there is
o match, then try to match to the old ﬁrm name available in
madeus. We  need to confront a number of issues. First, in any
iven year, the Amadeus database excludes the names of ﬁrms
hat have not ﬁled ﬁnancial reports for four consecutive years (e.g.
&A, default). We  deal with this issue in several ways. First, we
se information from historical versions of the Amadeus database
1995–2006) on names and name changes for European ﬁrms.
econd, even though Amadeus and Icarus contain a unique ﬁrm
dentiﬁer (BVD ID number), there are cases in which ﬁrms with
dentical names have different BVD numbers. In these cases, we
se other variables for identiﬁcation, for example: address (ZIP
ode), date of incorporation (whether consistent with the patent
pplication date), and more. Finally, we manually match most of
he remaining corporate patents to the list of Amadeus and Icarus
rms.
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